In this paper, we analyze optimal foreign direct investment of a firm which operates in a duopolistic market. We characterize a technology spillover threshold and show that for an intensity of spillovers below this threshold, there is a unique locally asymptotic stable steady state with a positive capital stock in the developing country. Furthermore, we characterize how optimal foreign investment patterns and the investor's value function depend on the level of technology transferred and characterize the optimal level to be used for the foreign direct investment.
Introduction
Based on UNCTAD statistic, worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) had increased by a factor of more than 10 from 1983 to 2003. And this trend continues, from 2003 to 2013, the FDI inward and outward flows doubled again. While most FDI is still undertaken in industrialized countries, such as the US, Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands, just to mention a few, more and more investment flows to the newly industrializing countries (NICs), especially Asian (mainly China and India) and Central and Eastern Europe, which have recently joined the EU. Indeed, the UNCTAD statistic presents that the emerging market takes more and more shares in the worldwide FDI, from less than 1/5 in 1983 to almost half in 2013 at the aggregate of inward and outward of FDI.
The motivation for firms to invest in NICs are primarily to get access to these markets and to benefit from in part drastically lower factor costs there. And cost reduction motivation becomes the main factor influencing the location decisions of firms. For example, Ireland provides a considerable tax incentive for foreign firms by offering a corporate tax rate of 10 percent to all manufacturing firms producing in Ireland (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004) . The reasons for governments to attract FDI seem to be clear.
Investment raises employment and growth and may also generate positive spillover effects for local firms. The latter seems to be of particular importance for NICs, which hope to get access to modern technologies in this way. While there is empirical evidence that spillovers of FDI exist (see e.g. the survey by Lim, 2001 ). There are also econometric studies, nevertheless, fail to find unambiguously positive effects, see for example Aitken and Harrison (1999) . One reason for this may be the lack of sufficiently good microeconomic data on the firm level (cf. Görg and Greenaway, 2004 ).
Nevertheless, great many empirical studies do find evidence for such spillover effects. Especially, Blomstrom et al. (2001) states "foreign investors make available (di-rectly or indirectly) appropriable to host country business. Appropriable technology should be viewed broadly as any tangible or intangible resource that can generate economic rent for host country firms, · · · by improving total factor productivity." Based on this kind of argument and via using new firm-level data for German and Italian manufacturing firms during the 1990s, Peri and Urban (2006) provide evidence of significant technological spillover effects "which is robust to various ways of measuring the total productivity of firms · · · ." More related literature can be seen in Dawid and Zou (2014) .
In this paper, we follow some FDI literature, such as, Das (1987) , Wang and Blomstrom (1992), Petit et al. (2000) , Dawid et al. (2010) , among others (for a survey of theoretical models, see Cheng (1984) or Saggi (2002) ), and assume that the change in the host country's productivity is formulated as an increasing function of the presence of foreign capital stock. Here, multinational firm have to decide whether and, if so, how much to invest in a developing economy. Firm invests in physical capital, but investment in physical capital is associated with positive technology spillovers which raise the stock of knowledge of their competitors, thus, negatively affecting its own sales and reduces profits.
Differing from the above literature, we model the growth rate of technological spillover, rather than the technological change itself, depends on the accumulated capital stock and the technology gap. Thus, the main result is that we frame a technological spillover threshold. When the absorption rate of developing country is below this threshold, there is less possibility for technological spillover and hence it is beneficial to take advantage of developing country's low marginal cost of production. Thus, this kind of FDI leads to a long run steady state where there is positive capital stock in the developing country. Furthermore, this technological spillover threshold exposes information for high technique firms which kind of technology should take to the foreign country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the theoretical model. In section 3 we first analyze the long-run behavior of the investment policy of the firm, formulate the technological spillover threshold and provide information on which level of technology should take for FDI. Then, via numerical method, we present the trajectory dynamics under different cases. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider a dynamic two-country model where country H ('home country') is a developed industrialized country whereas country F ('foreign country') is a newly industrializing country. We denote by Q i (t) the output of firm i at time t, i = H, F .
Firms produce using labor as the only variable production input. Production capacities of a firm in a country are determined by its capital stock there. Output per input unit in the two countries is given by A H (t) and A F (t) with A H (t) > A F (t). If the firm from country H produces in country F , productivity reads A HF (t) where initially A F (0) < A HF (0) < A H (0). Since our focus is on the effects of technological spill-overs generated by FDI on the evolution of the technology gap between the two countries, we abstract from technological change in the developed country. The technology, A HF , which firm H takes to invest in country F, may change over time depending on the situation in country F given A F (t) may change over time due to spill-over effects. In both countries labor is supplied at wage rates w H and w F , where w H >> w F .
We assume that firms in country H can reduce their unit production costs if they produce in the foreign country, i.e.,
In order to produce abroad, firm H has to invest to build up production capacities in country F. We denote by I(t) ∈ R foreign investment of firm H and by K F (t) the capital stock of firm H in country F at time t. It should be noted that we also allow for negative investment, and due to the spillover-effects described below disinvestment might in principle be optimal for firm H. The capital accumulation equation is given byK
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and I ∈ R which reads if I > 0 there is positive investment, while I < 0, disinvestment is possible. 
given by rewriting it asȦ 
, where for simplicity, we assume that foreign investment will not increase the wage rate in the country F .
In the following, we take linear demand function and the inverse demand function is given by
whereP is a positive constant reservation price. Then, the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium for our duopolistic market with heterogenous marginal production cost are demonstrated in detail by Dawid et al (2010) . Furthermore, the equilibrium outputs and price in the duopolistic market are given as follows:
Therefore, firm H's equilibrium profit is
In the following, we impose condition such that even the wage rate, w F , in country F is sufficiently low, there is still positive output produced by firm H-marginal production cost of firm H is not too high.
A first observation is the following:
H is continuously differentiable with respect to A F and K F . Moreover,
Indeed, this Lemma demonstrates the conflict, from firm H's point of view, of foreign direct investment which we introduced in the introduction: on the one hand, FDI reduces firm H's cost and hence increases its profit; but on the other hand, FDI with technological spillover induces more competition and thus deduces profit of firm H.
In the following section we analyze the dynamic optimization problem of Firm H.
We consider how the outcomes change when the technological spillover depends on A F , except the technological gap A HF − A F .
The dynamic optimization problem of Firm H
After having determined the optimal level of production, firm H faces the intertemporal problem of choosing optimal investment strategy, I(t) ∈ R, to maximize its profit:
subject to accumulation of capital (2), technological spillover (3) with K F (0) and A F (0)
given, and the state constraint
where r > 0 is the time preference parameter. βI + γI 2 are gross investment costs, while I are net investment costs, with unit adjustment γ a positive constant and purchasing cost β > 0 playing the role of Tobin's q. The difference between gross and net investment cost is due to purchasing and adjustment costs of investment.
The dynamics
In what follows, we shall characterize the inter-temporally optimal investment for firm H. Applying Pontryagin's maximum principle and standard Lagrangian method, a canonical system of ordinary differential equations can be derived that has to be satisfied by the optimal trajectories. However, since the optimized Hamiltonian of the dynamic optimization problem of firm H is not concave with respect to the two state variables, K F and A F , the Maximum principle provides only necessary but not sufficient optimality conditions (see e.g. Dockner at al. (2000)). Nevertheless, Dawid et al.
(2010) demonstrate that the choice presented in the following proposition are optimal.
Proposition 1 For any state trajectory (K F (t), A F (t)) that corresponds to an optimal strategy of firm H, there exist piecewise absolutely continuous co-states µ K (t), µ A (t), and a multiplier η(t) ≥ 0, such that, the optimal investment is
and the costate equations arė
Furthermore, the multiplier checks 
In the following subsection, we characterize the potential steady states of the sys-
tem under optimal investment and analyze how the initial technology gap, (A HF −A F ), and firm F's technology, A F , determine which steady state is reached.
Rest points of the differential equations (2), (3), (9) and (10) give steady states for our model. It is easy to see that there are two different steady states: (I) Catching-up steady state with K F = 0 and (II) left-behind steady state with K F = 0.
Steady states
Let us first study the steady state with
we obtain the other variables of this steady state as
To guarantee nonnegative investment and capital stock at the steady state, if and only if µ K > β, which is equivalent to the following condition:
The economic meaning of this assumption is straightforward by recalling that the right hand side reads the gain from unit capital invested in country F. Thus, with positive long-run investment and capital stock in the foreign country, the gain should be larger than the purchasing price.
As concerns existence and stability of catching-up steady state, it turns out that the absorption rate plays a crucial role in that respect. Define
as the threshold for the spillover intensity. It is easy to check that this threshold, λ, increases with the difference of marginal costs,
, and the given FDI technology, A HF .
The next proposition shows that as long as the intensity is below this level, catchingup steady state is the unique long-run steady state.
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, 2 and FDI technology
there exists a λ > 0, which is given by (12) , such that, for every λ < λ, steady state (11) is the unique steady state. Furthermore, this steady state is locally asymptotic stable in its state space.
Proof: See appendix.
The Proposition 2 states that there exists a situation such that it can be optimal for the home country firm to build up a capital stock in the developing country, K F > 0, in the long-run. However, besides this outcome, it is also possible that the firm does not invest in the developing country in the long-run, so that K F = 0 holds. Whether there exist two steady states or only one catching-up steady state depends on the parameter λ, which determines how fast the developing country absorbs the new technology.
So, for λ > λ both steady states may be feasible, while for λ < λ only steady state with K F > 0 exists. From an economic point of view, the latter case means that the firm will always maintain a capital stock in the developing country and produce there if the catching-up speed of the developing country is small. Recalling that investment in the developing country increases the level of technology of the firms there and, thus, the competitiveness of these firms, this outcome is plausible. If this process is slow, the negative effect of investing in the foreign country, i.e. the spillovers, only takes place gradually. Therefore, for small values of λ it is always optimal to invest in the developing country in the long-run. It should also be noted that the value of λ does not affect the steady state values of investment and capital in the developing country in steady state.
Before closing this section, we notice that the threshold condition (12) 
where the left hand side states firm F's benchmark absorption ability, λA F , considering the technology gap (A HF − A F ) and evaluated at A F = A HF /2, which is the optimal level of Firm F's technological change, i.e., maximum of the right hand side of equation (3) . The right hand side of (13) is the unit gain-loss-ratio, where the gain comes from cost reduction from FDI, due to Assumption 2, and the loss comes from the technological spillover to firm F; and the ratio is discounted by time preference r.
Thus, condition λ < λ reads that, from the point of view of firm H, the optimal spillover , taking into account the technological gap and foreign firm's absorption ability, should not be larger than firm H's gain-loss-ratio of taking this FDI. Put this condi-tion differently, λ < λ condition is equivalent to
Changing the notation, it yields
which implicitly states the optimal FDI technology, that is, the FDI technology should be no more than the unit gain-loss-ratio by taking into account the discounting rate and firm F's absorption ability, λA F , and all evaluated at the maximum growth rate of spillover, here, A F = A HF /2.
More precisely, given firm F's absorption rate λ, rewriting the above inequality in term of A HF yields that A HF has to satisfy the following second order polynomial inequality condition:
which always has two roots with one negative and one positive. and decreases its catching-up speed after that 1 . In other words, the closer the technology of firm F to the level of A HF , the harder is it to catch up 2 . Keeping this in mind, then on the other hand, the gain from higher FDI technology is much higher than with lower one, which is given by
Therefore, combining these two sides together, for given absorption rate of the foreign country, the above proposition indeed provides information of FDI technology, which is new in literature.
We close this subsection by noticing that the second steady state implies that the home country firm H does not produce in the developing country in the long-run, i.e. A H = 4 A F (0) = 1.7 r = 0.03 It should be noted that under this parameter setting the unit costs of production in the own country (without any spillovers) are lower for firm F than for firm H (i.e.
Dynamics and the Effect of A HF on the Value Function
w F /A F (0) < w H /A H ). This implies that firm H can profit from transferring production to country F with a level of technology that is already used in that country (i.e. A HF = A F (0)). In such a case firm H can reduce own production costs without inducing any increase of the productivity of its competitor in country F . As we will show below that this does however not necessarily imply that foreign investment is profitable for firm
In Figure 1 we show the value function V (0, A F (0)) of firm H (i.e. the maximal discounted profit stream for firm H starting from no initial capital in country F and an implying that transferring the best available technology to firm H is optimal if the productivity in country F induced by such a transfer is close to A H . However, in the lower part of the considered range for A HF the relationship is negative, which implies that, if for some reason firm H cannot generate a productivity in country F that is substantially larger than the productivity of the local firm (in our parameter setting the threshold is approximately A HF = 2.0), then it is optimal for firm H to use the same technology in country F that is already used by firm F , thereby avoiding any spillovers to the local firm. To gain a better understanding of the reasons for the non-monotonicity of the value function of firm H we consider in Figure 2 the dynamics of instantaneous profits, that is, instantaneous utilities, and optimal investments of firm H for three different values of A HF . In panel (a) we also depict as a reference point the (constant) profit of firm H if it does not engage in any foreign investment (black line). The blue trajectories correspond to the case where firm H transfers an advanced technology to country F such that the productivity of firm H in country F is much larger than the productivity of the local firm F . It can be clearly seen in panel (a) that initially instantaneous payoffs of firm H are lower compared to a scenario where it would not engage in FDI. The reason clearly is that the firm has to cover substantial investment costs, whereas initially the capital stock in country F is so small that no large cost reductions can be achieved.
In the long run, however the cost savings for firm H dominate the investment costs that can be optimally gained and it is therefore optimal for firm H to refrain from any investments. Interestingly, there is however an interval of A HF value both above and below this range such that FDI is profitable.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic model of the firm from a developed country which operates in an duopolistic market. The firm has an incentive to invest and produce in a developing country to reduce production cost, but due to spillover, this investment raises the technology level of its competitors in the developing economy.
Following literature on absorptive capacity we assume that the intensity of the spillovers does not only depend on the size of the foreign capital stock of the hightech firm and the size of the technological gap, but also on the accumulated efforts to absorb the spillovers. Here, we measure these kind of efforts by the technology level in low-tech country.
We could demonstrate that there exists a unique steady state with a positive capital stock in the developing economy if the speed of technology transfer is below a certain threshold, which is determined by the optimal growth rate of spillover of technology. This makes sense from an economic point of view. If the catching-up process is relatively slow, the firm can be assured that the competitiveness of the firms in the developing country rises only slowly, so that it is optimal to build up a capital stock in the developing country in the long-run.
As a by-product, the threshold of absorption rate implicitly imposes conditions under which the high technology firm H should engage in FDI.
Based on numerical calculations we have then shown that the value function of firm H depends in a non-monotonic way on the level of transferred technology A HF .
In particular, we have demonstrated that using the technology that is already established in the foreign country is more profitable for firm H than transferring a better technology as long as the gap between the established and the transferred technology is not too large.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is finished by several steps. In
Step one, we first show the existence of this steady state, then in
Step two, we study the stability of this steady state and finally, we demonstrate the existence of threshold λ.
Step 1. Existence
Suppose that K F = 0 holds. SettingȦ F = 0,K F = 0,μ 1 = 0,μ 2 = 0, we obtain the other variables of this steady state as
The same arguments as in Dawid et al. (2010) , we can show that this fixed point of the canonical system is indeed a steady-state of the optimal policy of firm H.
Step 2. Stability
To determine stability of this steady state, we consider the Jacobian matrix at the steady state which is given by
It is easy to show that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by e 1 = −δ < 0, e 2 = δ + r > 0, e 3 = − λ 2 A HF K F < 0, e 4 = r + λ 2 A HF K F > 0.
Since there are two negative and two positive eigenvalues, the fixed-point is a saddle point of the canonical system, and, therefore, the steady state is locally asymptotically stable in its state space.
Step 3. Existence of λ
We start by considering the necessary conditions that have to be satisfied at a steadystate with K F = 0. In any such steady state, I = 0 must hold which implies µ K = β.
Thus,μ K = 0 yields
Since η ≥ 0, this is equivalent to This implies that a steady-state with K F = 0 can only exist for values of A F where
It is easy to prove that q 1 (A F ) is negative and concave in term of A F and checks Define λ as in the proposition, we finish the proof.
